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Abstract
This paper argues that television viewing produces higher mate-
rial aspirations, by enhancing both adaptation and positional eﬀects,
thus lowering the eﬀect of income on life satisfaction. Using individ-
ual data from the World Values Survey we present evidence indicating
that the eﬀect of income on both life and ﬁnancial satisfaction is sig-
niﬁcantly smaller for heavy television viewers, relative to occasional
viewers. This ﬁnding is robust to a number of speciﬁcation checks and
alternative interpretations. Overall, the results can be interpreted as
providing an additional explanation for the income-happiness para-
dox: the pervasive and increasing role of television viewing in people’s
life, by raising material aspirations, reduces the eﬀect of income on
individual happiness.
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from direct experience with the physical environment, and how
much of it comes only indirectly, from other people and the mass
media.”
(McLeod and Chaﬀee, 1972, p. 50)
1 Introduction
In the last three decades a number of studies have reported evidence on the
income-happiness paradox. In cross-sectional studies, higher income is gener-
ally associated with higher subjective well-being across individuals, although
the eﬀect is relatively small, and GDP per capita and subjective well-being
are positively and strongly correlated across countries (see e.g. Diener et al.,
1999). However, over time happiness does not grow with income: countries
with fast-growing GDP per capita have not shown corresponding increases
in well-being (e.g. Easterlin, 1974, Veenhoven, 1994, Oswald, 1997).
One of the main explanations of the income-happiness paradox is based
on the role of rising aspirations (e.g. Easterlin, 1995, 2001, Frey and Stutzer,
2002a,b). In this view, what matters for happiness is not income per se,
but the gap between income and material aspirations. To the extent that
aspirations rise together with income, subjective satisfaction may remain
unchanged as income rises. Material aspirations of individuals, in turn, are
inﬂuenced by two main processes (see Stutzer, 2004). On the one hand, the
adaptation to past income and consumption levels: people tend to adapt
quickly to higher income and consumption levels. As a consequence, addi-
tional material goods provide extra satisfaction only temporarily. On the
other hand, the comparison with other people’s income (Easterlin, 1995):
people tend to compare themselves with relevant reference groups in assess-
ing their income and consumption levels. As a consequence, they tend to be
less satisﬁed with a given level of income if their neighbours earn more.
A number of studies have provided evidence on the role of aspirations for
individual happiness. In a recent paper, Stutzer (2004) uses income evalua-
tion measures as a proxy for aspiration levels and shows that higher income
aspirations reduce individual subjective well being, ceteris paribus (see also
Stutzer, 2005). He also ﬁnds evidence that aspirations rise with own income
levels and with the average income of others, consistently with processes of
adaptation and social comparison. Clark and Oswald (1996) and Neumark
and Postlewaite (1998) provide evidence on the role of social comparison for
subjective well-being. However, relatively little evidence is available on the
determinants of aspirations.
This paper examines the eﬀects of television, the main agent of consumer
socialization, on individual aspirations. In particular, we focus on the impact
2of television viewing on income aspirations and, in turn, on the relationship
between income and individual happiness. The reason for the emphasis on
television is its pervasive role in individuals’ life: television viewing is by
far the most important leisure activity world-wide, and its role is growing
steadily.1
Most of the extensive literature on the eﬀects of television focuses on
the sociological and psychological dimensions, examining the impact of tele-
vision contents on social perceptions, attitudes and beliefs, or the eﬀects
of television viewing on individuals’ mental processes and health outcomes.
Economists have considered the impact of television on consumer behaviour,
but otherwise have largely ignored the impact of television on economic be-
haviour and outcomes.2 Quite surprisingly, given the pervasive role of tele-
vision in people’s life, with the exception of the recent work by Frey et al.
(2005) there have been hardly any studies examining the eﬀects of television
on individual well-being from an economic perspective.3
In this paper we argue that television viewing reduces the eﬀect of in-
come on life satisfaction by producing higher material aspirations, enhancing
both adaptation and positional eﬀects. More speciﬁcally, we formulate the
hypothesis that heavy TV users derive less satisfaction from a given level of
income, relative to occasional TV users, since television viewing has a signif-
icant positive impact on their material aspirations. In our view, television
has a powerful eﬀect on the satisfaction an individual derives from his in-
come and consumption levels by speeding up both the hedonic and positional
treadmills.
We investigate this hypothesis empirically using individual data from the
World Values Survey. The results indicate that the eﬀect of income on sub-
jective well being is signiﬁcantly lower for heavy-TV viewers. This ﬁnding is
robust to a number of speciﬁcation checks, while diﬀerent alternative inter-
pretations are examined and rejected. Overall, the results can be interpreted
as an indication that the role of TV in raising aspirations provides an ad-
ditional explanation for the income-happiness paradox: the pervasive and
increasing role of television viewing in people’s life contributes to raising in-
dividual material aspirations, thus lowering the eﬀect of higher income on
happiness.
1According to recent survey data (IP, 2004), in 2003 the average daily viewing time per
adult was above 3.5 hours in Europe and above 4.5 hours in the United States. Between
1995 and 2003 in Western Europe the average daily viewing time for adults increased from
186 to 217 minutes.
2The work of Corneo (2005) on the relationship between television viewing and working
time represents a major exception.
3Layard (2005a) focuses on the eﬀects of television viewing on perceived relative income.
Using data from the US General Social Survey, he ﬁnds that television viewing is negatively
related to perceived relative income and, in turn, to subjective well-being.
3The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses alternative expla-
nations of the income-happiness paradox. Section 3 illustrates how television
viewing aﬀects material aspirations and, therefore, the relationship between
income and subjective well-being. Section 4 presents the methodology and
the data set used for the empirical analysis, while the results are presented
in section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the main implications
of the analysis.
2 The Income-Happiness Paradox and its ex-
planations
The rediscovery of happiness in economics has been mainly a by-product of
a process originated in psychology. In fact, the paper published by Brick-
man and Campbell in 1971, under the telling title “Hedonic relativism and
planning the good society”, can be considered the starting point of the new
studies on happiness and its paradoxes related to the economic domain. In
their study, the two psychologists extended the “adaptation level” theory to
individual and collective happiness, reaching the conclusion that bettering
the objective conditions of life (income or wealth) has no lasting eﬀects on
personal well-being. Such a thesis should have provoked a serious method-
ological discussion about the meaning of the analysis of the nature and causes
of the wealth of nations. Yet, it did not. Their study remained practically
unknown to mainstream economics for years.
Two economists, Richard Easterlin (1974) and Tibor Scitovsky (1976)
were persuaded, however, that what was going on in that ﬁeld of psychology
could have something important to say for economic analysis. So, the “para-
dox of happiness” entered economics, bringing economic science back to its
classical origins. In fact, the relationship between wealth and happiness was
central in the classical tradition. However, the contemporary economists of
happiness were generally not aware of such an old tradition. Their reference
points were more recent: Duesenberry’s (1949) social theories of consump-
tion, or the American Institutionalist tradition (from Veblen to Galbraith).4
Easterlin (1974), relying on empirical research on individuals’ happiness,
opened up the debate about the “happiness paradox”. Making use of two
types of data, both based on a subjective self-evaluation of happiness,5 East-
erlin found that within a single country, at a given moment in time, the
4In a parallel stream of research, the Dutch economist Bernard Van Praag, in his
doctoral thesis (1968), showed an unusual and heterodox interest in investigating wealth
and well-being amidst the almost complete indiﬀerence of mainstream economists.
5The ﬁrst type of data was supplied by the responses to a Gallup-poll type of survey
in which a direct question was asked, a question which is still at the basis of most of the
present analyses on happiness: “In general, how happy would you say that you are - very
4correlation between income and happiness is strong and robust.6 In cross-
sectional data among countries, instead, the positive association between
wealth and happiness, although present, is neither general nor robust and
poorer countries do not always appear to be less happy than richer coun-
tries.7 But the most interesting result came from the analysis of time series
at the national level: in thirty surveys over 25 years (from 1946 to 1970 in the
US) per capita real income rose by more than 60 per cent, but the proportion
of people who rated themselves as “very happy”, “fairly happy” or “not too
happy” remained almost unchanged.
The main drift of Easterlin’s seminal paper was developed two years later
by Tibor Scitovsky’s Joyless Economy (1976). Hirsch (1976), Ng (1978) and
Layard (1980) all brought new insights to the new theme of happiness in
economics, which started to grow slowly but steadily.8 Today the “paradox
of happiness” is gaining growing attention among economists, psychologists,
social scientists and also, through the media, within the general public. The
issue is relevant in economic theory: explaining the happiness paradoxes calls
into questions some of the basic tenets of contemporary economics. The fo-
cus of the theoretical debate about the paradox of happiness, however, is
contentious. Almost all scholars, from diﬀerent backgrounds, agree that over
time happiness does not grow with income.9 The income-happiness relation-
happy, fairly happy or not very happy?” (Easterlin, 1974, p. 91). The other set of data
came from more sophisticated researches carried out by the psychologist Hadley Cantril
(1965), another forerunner of contemporary quantitative studies on happiness, concerning
people’s fears, hopes and satisfaction in 14 countries. The subjects interviewed were asked
to classify their own satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10.
6“In every single survey, those in the highest status group were happier, on the average,
than those in lowest status group” (Easterlin 1974, p. 100).
7“If there is a positive association among countries between income and happiness it
is not very clear. The results are ambiguous” (Easterlin 1974, p. 108). Cantril’s data
showed, for instance, that people in Cuba and Egypt were more satisﬁed than in West
Germany (1965, p. 258).
8In 1997 the new theme surfaced in a debate in the Economic Journal, thus reaching
a wider scientiﬁc audience.
9“Over time and across OECD countries, rises in aggregate income are not associated
with rises in aggregate happiness. At the aggregate level, there has been no increase
in reported happiness over the last 50 years in the US and Japan, nor in Europe since
1973 when the records began.” (Layard 2005b, p. 148). A recent paper by Hagerty and
Veenhoven (2003) challenges this thesis, claiming that growing GDP is associated with
greater happiness. Easterlin (2004) replied to this paper defending his classical thesis.
Already in 1991 Veenhoven criticized Easterlin’s thesis about international comparisons.
He plotted the same data as Cantril, though using the same scale on both axes, and showed
that the relationship follows a convex pattern of diminishing returns. A similar criticism
has been put forward by Oswald (1997, p. 1817) and many others, but the idea of a very
low correlation between happiness and income growth is still the most accepted among
economists working on happiness.
5ship within a single country at a given moment in time is not controversial.10
Across countries the relationship is more controversial.11
There are several explanations for the Easterlin paradox. The main theo-
ries can be grouped into three categories: hedonic, satisfaction and positional
explanations. The ﬁrst two (hedonic and satisfaction treadmills) have been
put forward by psychologists, whilst the third one (positional treadmill) can
be considered an internal evolution of the economic tradition.12
2.1 The hedonic treadmill
The hedonic explanation is based on set point theory. According to set-point
theories of Subjective Well-Being (SWB) there is a level of happiness which
remains practically constant during the life cycle. Personality and temper-
ament characteristics, basically innate to individuals, play a prominent role
in determining the level of happiness of individuals. Therefore, life circum-
stances, including health and income, are likely to account for a very small
percentage of variation in SWB: people initially do react to events, but they
then return to baseline levels of well-being that are determined by personality
factors (Argyle 2001, Lucas et al. 2002).
Empirical studies (e.g. Lykken and Tellegen, 1996) concluded that more
than 80 percent of the variance in long-term levels of SWB could be attributed
to temperament. On this basis, researchers have claimed that people have
inborn SWB set-points. The various shocks that hit us in our lifetime aﬀect
our happiness only temporarily. We inevitably return to our set point after
a brief period during which an event has indeed aﬀected our satisfaction
levels. As pointed out by Daniel Kahneman: “[...] individuals exposed to life-
10The same thesis appears in Frank: “When we plot average happiness versus average
income for clusters of people in a given country at a given time , rich people are in fact
a lot happier than poor people. It’s actually an astonishingly large diﬀerence. There’s no
one single change you can imagine that would make your life improve on the happiness
scale as much as to move from the bottom 5 percent on the income scale to the top 5
percent” (2005, p. 67). And Layard: “Of course within countries the rich are always
happier than the poor” (2005b, p. 148).
11Layard makes an important distinction: “if we compare countries, there is no evidence
that richer countries are happier than poorer ones - so long as we conﬁne ourselves to
countries with incomes over $15,000 per head. At income levels below $15,000 per head
things are diﬀerent, since people are nearer to the absolute breadline. At these income
levels richer countries are happier than poorer ones. And in countries like India, Mexico
and Philippines, where we have time series data, happiness has grown as income levels
have risen” (2005, p. 149).
12The ﬁrst economist who attempted to explain the income-happiness in terms of “tread-
mill eﬀects” was Easterlin himself, in his 1974 paper. His explanation was based on Due-
senberry’s (1949) “relative consumption” assumption. In his recent contributions Easterlin
adds to the “relative consumption” hypothesis an explicitly “psychological” explanation
based on the concept of hedonic adaptation or set-point theory.
6altering events ultimately return to a level of well-being that is characteristic
of their personality, sometimes by generating good or bad outcomes that
restore this characteristic level” (1999, p. 14).
Many social scientists today maintain that there is a hedonic treadmill
operating in the area of economic goods. The hedonic treadmill, an expres-
sion coined by Brickman and Campbell (1971), is a metaphor deriving from
set-point theory. It refers to the idea that one is running constantly, towards
material achievements, and yet remains at the same place because the tread-
mill runs at the same pace, or even faster, thus leading to lower levels of
happiness.
Set-point theories are very popular today also among economists, imply-
ing that happiness is essentially a congenital matter that mostly depends on
subjective elements, such as character, genes, or the inherited capacity to
live with and overcome life’s hardship. In this view, there exists a given level
of happiness, around which individuals gravitate due to diﬀerent life-time
experiences.13
2.2 The satisfaction treadmill
Kahneman (2000) makes a distinction between two types of treadmill eﬀects,
namely, the hedonic treadmill and the satisfaction treadmill. Whilst the he-
donic treadmill depends on adaptation, the satisfaction treadmill depends on
aspiration.14 A similar distinction between the two treadmill eﬀects is made
by Frey and Stutzer: “This process, or mechanism, that reduces the hedonic
eﬀects of a constant or repeated stimulus, is called adaptation. According
to aspiration level theory, individual well-being is determined by the gap
between aspiration and achievement” (2005, p. 125).
The satisfaction treadmill works in such a way that one’s subjective hap-
piness (self-evaluation) remains constant even when one’s objective happiness
improves. In this case, someone who buys a new car gets a boost in his ob-
jective well-being, or happiness, but the fact that he has had a rise in income
has also made his aspirations rise about the ideal car to own, so that his
13This approach is not far from the theses of Herrnstein and Murray (1994), who claimed
the uselessness of social programs on the basis of the innate level of intelligence that cannot
be changed by education. Although in a quite diﬀerent methodological line, Veenhoven
(2005) rejects the common stereotype that sees misery, handicaps and inequality in income
distribution as the main causes of people’s unhappiness, reaching the conclusion that there
is no paradox of happiness in Easterlin’s sense. In his World Database of Happiness, Ghana
and Colombia rank highest in terms of happiness levels. France and Italy take a back-seat
to Guatemala.
14“On this hypothesis, Californians could indeed enjoy life more than others. However,
if they also require more enjoyment than others to declare themselves happy, they will
not report higher subjective happiness. Californians might be happier than other people
objectively, but not subjectively.” (Kahnemann, 2000, p. 17).
7subjective satisfaction level remains the same. This is true even though he
may be objectively more comfortable in his new car.15 As a consequence, as
their incomes increase, people are induced to seek continuous and ever more
intense pleasures in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction.
Layard calls this eﬀect the “eﬀect of habit”: “if people adopt a higher
living standard, they lose the option to return to they former living standard
and experience the same utility as before from a given consumption” (2005, p.
155). This mechanism is also very close to the concept of reference-dependent
preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), one of the most important ideas
in modern behavioral economics.
2.3 The positional treadmill
Explanations based on the relative consumption hypothesis can be consid-
ered a development of the aspiration theory. The positional or relative con-
sumption hypothesis is not a new one. Over a century ago, Veblen (1899)
deﬁned consumption as a social issue, given that the most signiﬁcant acts of
consumption are normally carried out in public, under the others’ view.16
Duesenberry (1949) was the ﬁrst economist to introduce explicitly relative
consumption theory. Duesenberry claimed that a person derives utility, or
satisfaction, from his own level of consumption in relation or in comparison
to the level of other people’s consumption (1949, p. 32). Therefore, the
utility of a person’s level of consumption is relative and not absolute. In
this view, people are constantly comparing their material achievements with
those of some reference group. It is the “keeping up with the Jones” idea,
where utility depends on consumption relative to that of the others, rather
than just on its absolute level.
More recently, Scitovsky (1976, cap. 6) dealt with the relationship be-
tween consumption and status, and Hirsch (1977) coined the term “positional
good”. Today many economists are working on relative consumption or in-
come theories with this interdisciplinary approach. The basic element of the
theory is the concept of externality, in particular positional externality, that
is connected to the idea of conspicuous consumption: conspicuous commodi-
15On the basis of the distinction between objective and subjective happiness, Kahneman
maintains the individual and social importance of improving the objective conditions of
happiness, even if such improvements are not felt subjectively. To drive more comfortable
cars or eat better food is an expression of a higher quality of life (“objective happiness”, in
Kanheman’s terms) although, because of the hedonic treadmill, there can be no increase
in subjective terms.
16We should also mention the intuitions of the classical economists Smith and Gen-
ovesi about the social dimensions of consumption, and that the institutional American
economists have always cultivated an interdisciplinary-line of research between economics,
psychology and sociology.
8ties are, in a sense, commons, with the typical phenomena of rivalry and
over-exploitation.17 Following Frank’s and Oswald’s research, Layard recog-
nizes that “a rise in the average income in the state where you live reduces
your happiness by one third as much as a rise in your own income increases
it”. And, referring to the labour market, “a rise in wages of comparable
workers reduces your job satisfaction as a rise in your own wage increases it”
(Layard , 2005b, p. 150).
Summing up, people make social comparisons in evaluating their material
achievements. Relative consumption theory can therefore be described as a
further treadmill eﬀect. Something else is running along with our income or
consumption: the income of others.
3 The eﬀect of television on income aspira-
tions
As discussed above, rising aspirations provide one of the main explanations of
the income-happiness paradox: individuals’ subjective well being depends on
the gap between material achievements and aspirations. To the extent that
aspirations rise together with income, subjective satisfaction may remain
unchanged as income rises. In this section we consider the eﬀect of televi-
sion on two of main processes by which income aspirations are determined:
adaptation to past income and consumption levels and social comparison.
The introduction and diﬀusion of television was one of the most signiﬁcant
social events of the twentieth century.18 Television is widely recognised as
17Positional explanations of the happiness paradox make use of the economic concept
of externality, and, therefore, refer to the non-intentionality of the mechanism that leads
people towards unhappiness traps. In particular, in positional theories the externality that
agent A generates aﬀects agent B’s SWB by means of a reduction of the utility derived from
a given level of consumption (or income). “That many purchases become more attractive
to us when others make them means that consumption spending has much in common
with a military arms race. A family can choose how much of its own money to spend, but
it cannot choose how much others spend. Buying a smaller-than-average vehicle means
greater risk of dying in an accident. Spending less on an interview suit means a greater
risk of not landing the best job. Yet when all spend more on heavier cars or more ﬁnely
tailored suits, the results tend to be mutually oﬀsetting, just as when all nations spend
more on armaments. Spending less - on bombs or on personal consumption - frees up
money for other pressing uses, but only if everyone does it”. (Frank 2005, p. 84)
18As observed by Layard (2003): “Television diﬀers from any previous medium of com-
munication in two ways. The ﬁrst is immediacy. But the second is the sheer amount of
exposure. The typical (median) Briton watches television for 3 hours a day roughly 25
hours a week. Over a lifetime a typical Briton spends more time watching television than
doing paid work. In most European countries viewing is rather lower but it is above 2
hours a day in most countries. So it is not fanciful to suppose that TV has had a profound
inﬂuence on our lives and on our well-being.” Layard (2003, p. 15)
9one of the most powerful agents of socialization in contemporary society. In
particular, television plays a key role in consumer socialization, by providing
consumers with information used in constructing their mental representation
of reality.19 Television therefore contributes signiﬁcantly to deﬁne what our
goals are, or should be. We argue that, by acting as a powerful agent of con-
sumer socialization, television produces higher material aspirations and, as a
consequence, lower levels of well being for a given level of material achieve-
ments. More precisely, television viewing produces its eﬀects on material
aspirations in two main ways.
First, when watching television people are the target of images of more
and better products than what they have. Advertisers are aware that new
demand can be created if people are not satisﬁed for too long with what they
have. As a consequence, people are constantly oﬀered new and improved
products that promise a better and happier life, with television playing a key
role in this process. This increases people’s desire for material possessions,
as they are induced to compare the goods they consume with new goods
and new varieties of existing goods.20 Television viewing therefore makes
them less satisﬁed with what they consume, and, consequently, decreases
the satisfaction derived from any given level of income or consumption of
material goods.21 In this perspective, TV can be seen as a powerful factor in
speeding up the satisfaction treadmill, through faster growth of aspirations.
Second, by watching TV people are overwhelmed by images of people
richer and wealthier than they are. This contributes to shifting up the
benchmark for people’s positional concerns: income and consumption lev-
els are compared not only to those of their actual social reference group,
but also to those of their virtual reference group, deﬁned and constructed
by television programs.22 Television viewing makes people less satisﬁed with
19“Television has a number of features that contribute to its impact as an agent of
consumer socialization. First, it is ubiquitous: the average American family watches more
than seven hours of television per day, the average individual more than four hours per day.
Second, the eﬀects of television are often invisible. Watching television is so common that
its eﬀects can be obscured. Third, television supplies its viewers with images, accounts
and stories of life that often far removed from the viewer’s daily expoerience and social
milieu. Fourth, television’s message is homogeneous. Fifth, television’s representations of
social reality are often discrepant from objective reality.” (O’Guinn and Shrum, 1997, p.
278)
20As observed by Layard (2003, p. 16): “Television creates discontent by bombarding
us with images of body shapes, riches and goods we do not have. It does this both in TV
drama and in advertisements.”
21This is not to say that the new products or new varieties of existing products are
not better than the old ones, in terms of the utility they produce. The point, instead, is
that consantly being told that there is something better than what you have makes people
value less what they have.
22As observed by Layard (2003, p. 16): “The most obvious transformation of our life
10their income and wealth levels. In this perspective, TV can be seen as a
powerful factor in speeding up the positional treadmill, through comparison
with higher benchmark groups.
Television viewing aﬀects individuals’ material aspirations because it is
the main source by which people acquire social information and are driven
to make social comparisons. In the following sections we test empirically the
hypothesis that television has a positive eﬀect on aspirations and, therefore,
reduces the satisfaction obtained by individuals from a given income level.
4 Methodology and data
Let LSi be the life satisfaction of individual i, Yi his income and Y ∗
i his
income aspiration level. Assume that the life satisfaction of individual i at
time t depends on the gap between his income and income aspirations (see
Stutzer, 2004):
LSit = β0 + β1 (Yit − Y
∗
it) + β2Xit + εit (1)
where Xit is a set of variables which have independent eﬀects on an indi-
vidual’s reported subjective well-being, such as demographic factors, socio-
economic conditions, personality traits, environment characteristics, and εit
is an individual-time idiosyncratic error term.
Assume that current income aspirations are positively related to past own
income (Yit−1) and to current income of others (Yjt), reﬂecting the fact that











Next, assume that current own income is positively related to both Yit−1 and
Yjt, so that aspirations are positively related to current income. Assuming a
linear relationship, this implies that
Y
∗
it = λ0 + λ1Yit (3)
with λ1 > 0.
Substituting (3) in (1), and omitting time subscripts, we obtain
LSi = β0 − β1λ0 + β1 (1 − λ1)Yi + β2Xi + εi (4)
was the arrival of television, which shows us with total intimacy how other people live.
Where people once compared themselves with the people round the corner, they can now
compare themselves with anyone they like, up to J.R. in Dallas. It would be astonishing
if such comparisons were not unsettling.”
11Equation (4) indicates that, if aspirations are not directly observable,
the coeﬃcient of income incorporates the role of aspirations. In particular,
assuming that income aspirations have a negative eﬀect on life satisfaction,
ceteris paribus, and that they are positively related to actual income, the
omission of aspirations in estimating equation (4) determines a downward
bias in estimating the eﬀect of income on life satisfaction.
Now assume that, as discussed in the previous section, for any given level
of actual income, income aspirations are higher for heavy television viewers
(henceforth, high-TV), relative to light television viewers (henceforth, low-
TV). This implies that
Y
∗
i = λ0 + (λ1 + λ2TV )Yi (5)
where TV is a dummy variable indicating high-TV individuals, and λ2 is
assumed to be positive.
Substituting (5) in (1) we obtain
LSi = β0 − β1λ0 + β1 (1 − λ1 − λ2TV )Yi + β2Xi + εi
= γ0 + γ1Yi + γ2 (TV · Yi) + β2Xi + εi (6)
where γ0 = β0 − β1λ0, γ1 = β1 (1 − λ1), and γ2 = −β1λ2. Equation
(6) indicates that, if TV viewing raises material aspirations for any given
income level (λ2 > 0), the coeﬃcient characterizing the relationship between
income and life satisfaction should be lower for high-TV viewers relative to
low-TV viewers (γ2 < 0). The eﬀect of TV viewing on material aspirations
can therefore be examined by testing whether γ2 is signiﬁcantly lower than
0.
We estimate equation (6) using individual data from the World Values
Survey (see Inglehart et al., 2000). Four survey waves are currently available
(1980-82, 1990-91, 1995-97 and 1999-2001), containing a total of 264,778
observations. However, since the ﬁrst two waves do not contain information
about television viewing we could only use the third and fourth waves (69,875
and 22,174 observations, respectively). This reduced the available sample size
to 92,049 observations from 55 countries (see the data appendix for details).
The variable representing TV consumption levels is constructed from an-
swers to the question “Do you ever watch television? If yes: How much
time do you usually spend watching television on an average weekday (Not
weekends)?”, with the following options: “Do not watch TV or do not have
access to TV”; “1 - 2 hours per day”; “2 - 3 hours per day”; “More than 3
hours per day”. From this variable, we constructed a dummy variable taking
the value 1 for high-TV viewers (2-3 or more than 3 hours per day) and 0
for low-TV viewers (no TV or 1-2 hours per day). This deﬁnition splits the
sample almost equally (the sample mean of the TV > 2 dummy is 0.48).
12Two measures of subjective well being are used as proxies for happiness.23
The ﬁrst, life satisfaction, is based on the question: “All things considered,
how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?” and is measured
on a scale from 1 to 10. The second (ﬁnancial satisfaction) is deﬁned similarly
on the basis of the question “How satisﬁed are you with the ﬁnancial situation
of your household?”.24 The income indicator is measured by self-reported
deciles in the national distribution of income, so that income levels, deﬁned
in relative terms, are comparable across countries.25
The set of control factors includes individuals’ demographic characteris-
tics (age and gender) socio-economic conditions (self-assessment of freedom
and health, education, employment status), family characteristics (marital
status), personality traits (trust, honesty) and beliefs (importance of family,
friends, leisure, politics, work and religion). Details on the deﬁnition and
construction of these variables are provided in the data appendix.
One diﬃculty with using multi-country individual data is the need to
control for cultural and societal diﬀerences, that may play a key role in
explaining international diﬀerences in subjective well-being (Diener, 2000).26
All the equations estimated in the following include either continent-speciﬁc
geographic dummies (see Helliwell, 2002) or individual country dummies,
so that unobserved heterogeneity due to country-level cultural and societal
diﬀerences is controlled for. The equations are estimated by OLS, including
a time ﬁxed eﬀect to allow for heterogeneity between the two survey waves.27
Test statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
23For a discussion of the use of reported subjective well-being as an empirical approxi-
mation of individual happiness, see e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2002a).
24We also considered a third measure of subjective well being, happiness, based on the
question: “Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not
very happy, or not at all happy?”. The results were qualitatively similar to those obtained
using life satisfaction and ﬁnancial satisfaction.
25Respondents were asked which decile their household income falls within a ten-point
scale of national household income, such that a 1 indicates the ﬁrst or lowest decile and a
10 represents the tenth or highest decile.
26Helliwell (2002, p. 5) observes that “Since the data available for large-sample analysis
has only limited power to identify personality types, the estimate responses to particular
events will necessarily be an average across many diﬀerent personality types, so that the
explanatory power of equations based on individual responses is likely to be small.”
27The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using ordered probit or logit




Table 1 reports OLS estimates of equation (6) for the pooled sample (waves
3 and 4), with life satisfaction (column 2) or ﬁnancial satisfaction (column 4)
as dependent variable (measured on a scale from 10 to 100). The regressions
are estimated on about 55,000 individual observations, and include continent-
speciﬁc geographic dummies to control for cultural and societal diﬀerences
(see the appendix for details on the deﬁnition).
We start by considering the results for the control variables, in order to
provide a preliminary assessment of the empirical speciﬁcation. The health
and freedom indicators have large and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.28 Un-
employment lowers life satisfaction by almost 5 percentage points, and the
coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant. Medium and upper education levels have
negative eﬀect on individuals’ well-being, with only the former being signiﬁ-
cant.29 The results indicate a U-shaped pattern for diﬀerent age groups (six
groups from 15-24 to over 65): life satisfaction is signiﬁcantly higher for the
15-24 and over 65 age groups (see e.g. Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2000 for
Britain and the United States). The life satisfaction for males is 1.19 per-
centage points lower than that for females. Being married is associated to a
highly signiﬁcant 3.05 diﬀerence in life satisfaction. As for individual char-
acteristics, individuals who assign a high priority to either family, friends,
leisure or religion report systematically higher satisfaction levels, while the
opposite holds for those who consider important politics or work (although
the latter indicator is not signiﬁcant). Signiﬁcantly higher life satisfaction is
associated also to the honesty indicator (cheating on taxes is never justiﬁable)
and the trust dummy (in general, people can be trusted).
Income is positively and signiﬁcantly related to life satisfaction. The
eﬀect of income on life satisfaction, however, is signiﬁcantly lower for those
who watch more television. Moving up by one decile in the income scale is
28A one-point improvement in health, on a ﬁve point scale, is associated with a 5.62
rise in life satisfaction (on a scale 10 to 100). A one-point improvement in self-perceived
freedom, on a ten point scale, is associated with a rise in life satisfaction of 3.2 percentage
points. It should be noted, however, that both the health and freedom coeﬃcients may
overstate the eﬀect on subjective well-being, since self-reported well being, health and
freedom are likely to be aﬀected in the same direction by personality diﬀerences (see
Helliwell, 2002). Diener and Lucas (2000) also observe that whereas subjective assessments
of health are generally found to be related to happiness, the evidence for objective measures
is less clearcut.
29As observed by Helliwell (2002, p.11) “the education variables are among the weakest
in the WVS data, being based solely on the ages at which individuals ﬁnish their full-time
education. This is a very imperfect guide to how much education has been received or
what results or qualiﬁcations have been obtained.”
14associated to a 1.43 rise in life satisfaction for low-TV individuals. The eﬀect
of income is smaller by 0.7 percentage points for high-TV individuals, and the
diﬀerence is highly statistically signiﬁcant. This diﬀerence can be interpreted
as reﬂecting the eﬀect of television viewing on material aspirations.
When ﬁnancial satisfaction is used as the dependent variable, both the
eﬀect of income and the negative diﬀerential for high-TV viewers are larger
(2.56 and -0.85, respectively) and more strongly signiﬁcant. All the results
for socio-economic and demographic characteristics also apply to ﬁnancial
satisfaction. Interestingly, the importance of family is no longer signiﬁcantly
related to individual satisfaction, the coeﬃcient for politics is positive and
signiﬁcant, and that for work negative and signiﬁcant.
5.2 Robustness
Table 2 present results obtained by estimating equation (6) using individual
country dummies instead of area dummies, to check if the results are robust to
alternative ways of controlling for environmental diﬀerences. All the results
for socio-economic, demographic and individual characteristics are virtually
unchanged. The diﬀerential eﬀect of income for high-TV viewers is slightly
smaller (-0.45 and -0.59, for life and ﬁnancial satisfaction, respectively), but
remains strongly signiﬁcant.
Tables 3 and 4 present results obtained by estimating equation (6) sepa-
rately for waves 3 and 4. The responsiveness of life satisfaction to income is
signiﬁcantly lower for heavy-TV viewers in both waves. The negative diﬀer-
ential eﬀect is also found in the equation for ﬁnancial satisfaction, although
it is not signiﬁcant in wave 4.
Next, we examine the robustness of the results to the use of alternative
deﬁnitions of the television indicators. First, we consider a dummy variable
taking the value 1 for 1-2, 2-3, or more than 3 hours per day (TV > 0, table
5) and, second, a dummy variable taking the value 1 for more than 3 hours
per day (TV > 3, table 6). All the ﬁndings discussed above are robust to
the alternative deﬁnitions. The responsiveness of life satisfaction to income
is found to be signiﬁcantly lower using either indicator, with the eﬀect being
more pronounced for the TV > 0 dummy.
5.3 Alternative interpretations
One possible explanation of the negative coeﬃcient for the TV-income inter-
action dummy is that the eﬀect of income on well being may be non-linear,
with smaller well-being eﬀects attached to increases in income beyond certain
levels. If television consumption is positively related to income, the negative
sign of the coeﬃcient for the TV-income interaction could be spurious, as it
15would be simply capturing the non-linear eﬀect of income. We thus consider
the robustness of the results by including among the regressors either income
squared (table 7) or income interacted with a high-income dummy (table 8).
All the ﬁndings discussed above are robust to the alternative speciﬁcations.
Another possible interpretation of the negative coeﬃcient for the TV-
income interaction dummy is that it actually captures the diﬀerent eﬀect of
television on the well-being of individuals depending on their ﬁnancial con-
dition. In this view some kind of “reverse causality” applies, as it could
be argued that television is particularly beneﬁcial to low-income individuals,
whereas high-income individuals, having more alternative options available,
do not beneﬁt as much from television viewing. We thus consider the diﬀer-
ential eﬀect of income on life satisfaction for heavy-TV viewers separately for
low-income and high-income individuals. The results, reported in tables 9
and 10, conﬁrm the negative eﬀect of television viewing on the responsiveness
to income within both low- and high-income sub-samples, thus providing sup-
port to the causal interpretation of the coeﬃcient for the interaction dummy
in equation (6).30
6 Conclusions
Prior research has shown that television viewing has an important eﬀect on
how individuals perceive reality and, in particular, on their material aspi-
rations (see e.g. O’Guinn and Shrum, 1997, Shrum et al. 1998). A recent
study by Shrum et al. (2005), based on a sample of 321 Americans, ﬁnds
evidence that television cultivates materialism. A positive eﬀect of television
viewing on materialism was also found by Sirgy et al. (1998). There is also
extensive evidence that higher material aspirations have a negative impact
on life satisfaction (e.g. Stutzer, 2004, 2005).
In this paper we examined the eﬀects of television viewing on income
aspirations and, in turn, on the relationship between income and individual
happiness. We argued that television viewing reduces the eﬀect of income
on life satisfaction by producing higher material aspirations, enhancing both
adaptation and positional eﬀects. Using individual data for about 56,000
individuals from the World Value Surveys we presented evidence indicating
that the eﬀect of income on both life and ﬁnancial satisfaction is signiﬁcantly
smaller for heavy television viewers, relative to occasional TV viewers. This
ﬁnding was found to be robust to a number of speciﬁcation checks, while
diﬀerent alternative interpretations were examined and rejected.
30We also considered the possibility that the TV dummy might be capturing more gen-
erally unobservable individual characteristics, possibly thus aﬀecting other determinants
of subjective well being. We thus interacted each of the socio-economic variables regressors
in equation (6) with the TV dummy, but the interaction term was never signiﬁcant.
16The analysis presented in this paper complements the results in Bruni
and Stanca (2005), who ﬁnd that television viewing has a negative indirect
eﬀect on individual life satisfaction, through a signiﬁcant crowding out eﬀect
on relational goods. Our results also qualify, and extend to a large and
representative international data set, the ﬁndings in the recent studies by
Frey et al. (2005) and Layard (2005).
Overall, the results presented in this study can also be interpreted as
providing an additional explanation for the income-happiness paradox: as
standards of living improve, the pervasive and increasing role of television
viewing in people’s life contributes signiﬁcantly to raising material aspira-
tions, thus lowering the eﬀect of higher income on individual happiness.
177 Data appendix
The World Values Survey (WVS) provides information on individual beliefs
about politics, the economy, religious, social and ethical topics, personal ﬁ-
nances, familial and social relationships, happiness and life satisfaction. WVS
is a compilation of surveys conducted in more than 80 countries representing
about 85 per cent of the world’s population Within each country, samples are
selected randomly “from all administrative regional units after stratiﬁcation
by region and degree of urbanization” (Inglehart et al., 2000, p. 7). The ﬁrst
wave (1980-82) covers 23 countries (mostly OECD, 30,739 observations), the
second (1990-91) 43 countries (59,169 observations), the third (1995-97) 50
countries (78,574 observations), and the fourth wave (1999-2001) 68 coun-
tries (96,296 observations). There are 82 diﬀerent countries represented in
one of the four waves, for a total of 264,778 observations.
Summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are reported
in table 11. Income is measured by self-reported deciles in the national
distribution of income, so that income levels expressed in relative terms
are comparable across countries and individuals. Health is measured by
the self-assessed state of health, on a 1 to 5 scale (very good=5, good=4,
fair=3, poor=2, and very poor=1). Freedom is deﬁned as the self-assessment
of the degree of freedom of choice and control an individual has over his
life, on a 1 to 10 scale (1=none at all, 10=a great deal). Educational
levels are captured by three dummy variables for low (inadequately com-
pleted or completed elementary education, incomplete secondary school),
medium (complete technical/vocational secondary school, incomplete or com-
plete university-preparatory secondary school) and high education (some uni-
versity with or without degree/higher education).
The age of the respondent is measured either by dummy variables iden-
tifying the age group of the respondent (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64,
65 and older). We also control for gender, with a male dummy. Family
characteristics are described a dummy variable for marriage (equal to 1 if
the respondent is married), zero otherwise. The honesty variable is deﬁned
on individuals’ answers to whether it is justiﬁable to cheat on taxes, on a 1
to 10 scale (1=never justiﬁable, 10=always justiﬁable). The trust dummy
takes the value 1 for those who think that in general people can be trusted
(0 if “you cannot be too careful when dealing with people”). Respondents’
personality traits are proxied by the variables family, friends, leisure time,
politics, work, religion, measuring the importance attributed by respondents
to each of the above life domains on a 1 to 4 scale (1=not very important,
4=very important).
Geographic area dummy variables are deﬁned as follows: Latin Amer-
ica (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Puerto
18Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela), Asia (China, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, In-
donesia, Jordan, Taiwan), Africa (Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa, Morocco,
Zimbabwe, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania), continental Europe (West Germany,
Greece, Spain, Switzerland), Scandinavia (Sweden, Finland, Norway), for-
mer Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus), Eastern Europe (East Germany, Moldova, Croa-
tia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia Hercegovina), base-group (Australia, United
States).
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23Table 1: Determinants of individual satisfaction (area dummies)
Life satisf. (t-stat.) Fin. satisf. (t-stat.)
Income 1.43 (26.19) 2.56 (43.85)
Income * TV dummy -0.70 (-9.23) -0.85 (-10.56)
Socio-econ. characteristics
Health 5.62 (45.54) 4.23 (32.43)
Freedom 3.20 (69.56) 2.44 (52.49)
Unemployed -4.85 (-13.66) -4.94 (-13.21)
Low education Baseline Baseline
Middle education -0.61 (-2.40) -0.37 (-1.36)
High education -0.11 (-0.39) 0.64 (2.16)
Married 3.05 (13.53) 1.29 (5.39)
Male -1.19 (-6.24) -0.22 (-1.09)
Age 15-24 Baseline Baseline
Age 25-34 -2.58 (-8.45) -2.90 (-8.86)
Age 35-44 -3.41 (-10.24) -3.63 (-10.18)
Age 45-54 -3.09 (-8.44) -2.62 (-6.69)
Age 55-64 -1.27 (-3.20) -0.71 (-1.68)
Age 65 and over 2.19 (5.10) 4.93 (10.58)
Individual characteristics
Family 1.25 (4.82) -0.17 (-0.64)
Friends 0.64 (4.45) 0.65 (4.28)
Leisure 1.03 (7.85) 0.84 (6.12)
Politics -0.44 (-4.25) 0.32 (2.90)
Work -0.11 (-0.79) -0.69 (-4.49)
Religion 0.51 (5.00) 0.68 (6.23)
Honesty 0.37 (8.39) 0.19 (3.99)
Trust 1.40 (6.60) 1.66 (7.30)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.24
Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Dependent variable: life satisfaction. All equations include area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
24Table 2: Determinants of individual satisfaction (country dummies)
Life satisf. (t-stat.) Fin. satisf. (t-stat.)
Income 1.27 (22.63) 2.63 (43.74)
Income * TV dummy -0.45 (-6.00) -0.59 (-7.45)
Socio-econ. characteristics
Health 5.17 (41.67) 4.09 (31.50)
Freedom 3.03 (65.55) 2.30 (49.76)
Unemployed -4.17 (-11.86) -3.95 (-10.74)
Low education Baseline Baseline
Middle education -1.38 (-5.08) -1.39 (-4.90)
High education -0.88 (-2.98) -1.25 (-4.03)
Married 3.31 (14.91) 1.19 (5.06)
Male -1.00 (-5.35) -0.14 (-0.69)
Age 15-24 Baseline Baseline
Age 25-34 -3.07 (-10.18) -3.15 (-9.81)
Age 35-44 -4.17 (-12.61) -4.08 (-11.64)
Age 45-54 -4.02 (-11.07) -3.06 (-7.96)
Age 55-64 -2.35 (-5.93) -1.08 (-2.57)
Age 65 and over 0.68 (1.58) 4.36 (9.46)
Individual characteristics
Family 1.43 (5.56) -0.03 (-0.13)
Friends 0.46 (3.17) 0.51 (3.38)
Leisure 0.65 (4.95) 0.53 (3.90)
Politics -0.83 (-7.89) -0.28 (-2.51)
Work -0.09 (-0.66) -0.79 (-5.16)
Religion 0.75 (6.77) 0.64 (5.47)
Honesty 0.35 (8.11) 0.16 (3.43)
Trust 1.30 (6.19) 1.41 (6.27)
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.29
Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Dependent variable: life satisfaction. All equations include country dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
25Table 3: Income, TV and subjective well being (1995-1997)
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial satisfaction
Income 1.49 2.91
(24.13) (43.72)
Income*TV dummy -0.85 -1.16
(-10.14) (-12.77)
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.29
Observations 39212 39219
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and country dummies.
Data source: World Value Survey 3 (1995-1997)
Table 4: Income, TV and subjective well being (1999-2001)
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial satisfaction
Income 1.42 2.02
(12.78) (17.02)
Income*TV dummy -0.38 -0.21
(-2.32) (-1.21)
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.16
Observations 17046 16992
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and country dummies.
Data source: World Value Survey 4 (1999-2001)
26Table 5: Alternative dummy deﬁnition: watch TV at all
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial sat.
Income 1.99 3.23
(15.23) (23.28)
Income*TV dummy -1.10 -1.32
(-8.09) (-9.14)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.25
N. Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
Table 6: Alternative dummy deﬁnition: watch TV more than 3 hours
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial sat.
Income 1.26 2.33
(27.75) (48.03)
Income*TV dummy -0.72 -0.76
(-7.75) (-7.67)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.24
N. Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
27Table 7: Robustness check: decreasing returns to income





Income*TV dummy -0.67 -0.83
(-8.87) (-10.29)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.24
N. Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
Table 8: Robustness check: high income dummy
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial satisfaction
Income 1.53 2.71
(19.11) (31.87)
Income*HI dummy -0.67 -0.92
(-1.88) (-2.44)
Income*TV dummy -0.69 -0.85
(-9.15) (-10.47)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.24
N. Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
28Table 9: Income, TV and SWB: high-income individuals
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial sat.
Income 0.71 1.91
(4.78) (11.61)
Income * High-TV * High-income -0.43 -0.52
(-2.00) (-2.17)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.25
N. Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
Table 10: Income, TV and SWB: low-income individuals
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Financial sat.
Income 1.99 3.04
(15.88) (23.39)
Income * High-TV * Low-income -0.86 -0.82
(-4.72) (-4.31)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.25
N. Observations 56258 56211
Note: t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors).
Additional control variables (not reported) include socio-economic and individual
characteristics, as detailed in tables 1 and 2, and area dummies.
Data source: World Value Surveys 3 (1995-1997) and 4 (1999-2001).
29Table 11: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N. Obs
Life satisfaction 66.39 24.85 10.00 100.00 259947
Financial satisfaction 57.12 26.75 10.00 100.00 214363
TV viewing 1.58 0.96 0.00 3.00 92049
TV dummy 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 92049
Income decile 4.73 2.53 1.00 10.00 221148
Health 3.75 0.93 1.00 5.00 213305
Freedom 6.63 2.45 1.00 10.00 245836
Unemployed dummy 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 262882
Male dummy 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 260130
Married dummy 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 260449
Lower education 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 188968
Middle education 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 188968
Upper education 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 188968
Age 15-24 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 252491
Age 25-34 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 252491
Age 35-44 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 252491
Age 45-54 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 252491
Age 55-64 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 252491
Age over 64 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 252491
Family important 3.85 0.42 1.00 4.00 230650
Friends important 3.26 0.73 1.00 4.00 229932
Leisure important 3.07 0.81 1.00 4.00 228199
Politics important 2.26 0.96 1.00 4.00 226759
Work important 3.54 0.71 1.00 4.00 228871
Religion important 2.89 1.08 1.00 4.00 227079
Onesty 8.58 2.36 1.00 10.00 246262
Trust dummy 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 252181
Note: See the data appendix for details on the deﬁnition of the variables.
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